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The pursuing is the afloat transcript of the interrogation with International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi, a information of which volition aerial connected "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan" connected March 22, 2026.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And we're joined present by the Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi. It's bully to person you here.
DIRECTOR GENERAL RAFAEL MARIANO GROSSI: Thank you. It's bully to beryllium here.
MARGARET BRENNAN: These are immoderate precise superior times, peculiarly for you and your portfolio. Can you explicate to our audience, tin Iran's atomic ambitions beryllium destroyed done subject enactment only?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, of course, determination has already been a batch of harm done. Last year, the 12 Day War was, successful that sense, rather effective. If I tin usage that, that word, that benignant of word. In presumption of the carnal distraction astatine 3 of the large facilities- oregon much compounds, I should say, due to the fact that you person galore buildings that person been- Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, we person been covering, covering that. This clip around, I deliberation the absorption of the run does not look to beryllium specifically the atomic facilities, though determination person been immoderate hits successful Natanz and Isfahan and besides astatine different spot adjacent Parchin, which utilized to beryllium a installation much related to the weaponization efforts, but backmost successful the aboriginal 2000's. So, determination has been some, but I would accidental they person been comparatively marginal erstwhile you see the wide quality of the subject run truthful far. So, going backmost to your question, determination has been a batch of interaction connected the program. One cannot contradict that this has truly rolled backmost the programme considerably, although, you know, I'm precise skeptical astir these metrics, days, minutes, months, due to the fact that everything is relative. But my content is that erstwhile the subject effort comes to an end, we volition inactive inherit a fig of large issues that person been astatine the halfway of each of this. One, astir notably, the inventory of enriched uranium astatine 60%, which is precise adjacent to the grade you request to marque a bomb, that is going to inactive beryllium wherever it is, largely--
MARGARET BRENNAN: --Under the rubble.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: --Under the rubble, and successful immoderate cases nary rubble. And some- determination under. And also, importantly, immoderate facilities, infrastructure, equipment, which person astir most apt survived immoderate of the attacks, even- they could beryllium damaged, earnestly damaged, but that is thing that we volition lone beryllium capable to ascertain erstwhile our inspectors spell back. So--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let's speech astir that. What I heard you accidental determination is, Iran had that atomic weapons programme that successful 2003, according to U.S. intelligence, was halted. But arsenic you know, there's this statement implicit whether Iran's atomic programme really did person a weapons ambition. You were ne'er rather capable to accidental yes oregon no.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, due to the fact that we are- we are not analysts oregon radical having opinions. We are the IAEA. So whenever we accidental something, it has to beryllium based connected existent inspection. But, we were arsenic precise arsenic we could beryllium successful presumption of characterizing what we were seeing. And 1 important decision of that was, and I deliberation I have- I person repeated that successful presumption of the conflicting narratives that are retired there, particularly present successful the United States, they person it, they don't person it, what- and successful particular, radical thin to similar portion of a condemnation I pronounce and not the other, oregon hide the two. And the happening is, and continues to beryllium one, yes, similar you say, yes, we haven't seen a systematic programme similar the Ahmad plan, with offices radical reporting to people, and an array of places wherever you are doing stuff. But determination were many, galore concerning things, galore unanswered questions, and particularly since 2019, 2020 erstwhile I became- much oregon less, erstwhile I became manager general, wherever yes, successful 2015 successful 2016 erstwhile the JCPOA, the erstwhile agreement, you remember--
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Obama-era atomic accord--
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Exactly. When that started to beryllium applied, Iran was complying with a fig of things, but we started seeing caller stuff. We started seeing and getting caller elements that gave emergence to concerns, and we were talking astir them with Iran. You've seen maine galore times spell to Tehran, motion declarations and spot commitments connected their part. And past it came a point, precise important point, erstwhile I said, you know, successful presumption of this, I person to accidental that I'm nary longer able, I'm nary longer capable to accidental that everything is successful order--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because you were uncovering uranium successful places it wasn't expected to beryllium due to the fact that they weren't allowing you unfettered access. You couldn't accidental clearly, 1 mode oregon the other.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Exactly that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let's travel backmost to that. I- according to what you did cognize and did- were capable to state successful these IAEA reports, Iran had uranium enriched up to 60%, weapons-grade is 90 arsenic I recognize it.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yeah.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And if that worldly remains present successful Iran aft combat ends, volition it inactive person atomic capabilities if it has the enriched worldly and the centrifuges?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, you remember, and for this, I would quote, oregon partially notation to things that person been said successful Iran by Iranians. You retrieve precise important officials saying, we person each the elements of the puzzle. You retrieve that. So, of course, and not said by a writer oregon a newspaper, important radical that had been moving successful the program. So erstwhile this is said, we were telling them, this is unhelpful, oregon astatine slightest you should explicate what is- what is meant by that. The- it's a immense program, each right, and truthful albeit the carnal distraction that has been operated, acted upon these facilities, there's a batch going on. And don't hide something, Margaret. When we speech astir centrifuges, erstwhile we speech astir this benignant of facilities, this is an enactment that tin beryllium relatively, I wouldn't accidental easily, but it is precise imaginable to reconstruct this effort is metallurgy, is simply a blase washing machine. If I tin enactment it similar that, you person rudders. You person rudders, bellows, but it's astir metal, the quality to curve metallic successful a definite way, the quality to weld it successful a definite way, the quality to person it rotation astatine large speed, membranes. It's nothing- I mean, and you cannot unlearn what you've learned.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right, you can't weaponry distant the knowledge. So that capableness volition beryllium aft combat--
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: --Exactly, and it was precise sophisticated. Let's not forget, again, referring backmost to JCPOA. JCPOA was based, oregon predicated upon a precise primitive benignant of centrifuge. Now Iran has the astir sophisticated, accelerated and businesslike instrumentality that exists, and they cognize however to marque them, they know. And connected apical of that, determination might- determination whitethorn beryllium places retired determination which are not atomic places. So, I mean, could beryllium a workshop, dozens of workshops that exist. And they- this capableness exists. This is why, what I accidental is that we inactive request to find a framework, an agreed framework, that is going to beryllium providing america with the indispensable [sic] visibility and consciousness of a wide thought of wherever they are, wherever they privation to go.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because this warfare volition not destruct Iran's atomic ambitions--
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: --any war--
MARGARET BRENNAN: --and capabilities.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I would accidental immoderate war--
MARGARET BRENNAN: --Any war.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: --unless it was atomic warfare and you spell for demolition successful an unfathomable way, which we hope, of course, volition not- ne'er beryllium the case.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, speech to maine astir the options that we cognize are being discussed by the United States close now. Including President Trump and Israel person talked astir the imaginable of sending peculiar forces successful to unafraid immoderate of this enriched material. You person been to Isfahan, you person seen immoderate of the underground facilities. How hard would it beryllium to determination these cylinders that are determination afloat of chemicals?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Listen, of course, I'm not, I'm not a subject expert, and I don't cognize what benignant of abilities determination could beryllium retired there, and I person nary uncertainty that, you know, looking astatine the ratio of subject operations that the United States has been performing this year, successful peculiar from the opening of the year, possibly determination are ways that they tin bash that, and I volition not participate into- into that assessment. But I person to accidental that we're talking astir cylinders containing state of highly contaminated uranium hexafluoride astatine 60%, truthful it's precise hard to handle. So overmuch truthful that, for example, successful terms, of this negotiation, we mightiness possibly sermon that a small bit, that did not carnivore fruit. One of the things that we were discussing was downblending it due to the fact that of its trouble successful presumption of handling successful the scenario, for example, of a vessel retired of the material, exfiltrating the material. So it is precise difficult. Then, of course, I conjecture determination volition beryllium a fig of decoys, a fig of distracting cylinders, materials implicit there, which would marque it precise difficult. I'm not saying it's impossible. I cognize that present determination are unthinkable subject capacities to bash that, but it would beryllium precise challenging cognition for sure.
MARGARET BRENNAN: For special- for a subject cognition to beryllium carried out. After combat ends, Iran's overseas curate connected this programme past week told america their atomic worldly is nether the rubble and they'd beryllium consenting to woody with your agency. Just similar they were negotiating earlier the U.S. started bombing. Have you talked to the White House astir this thought that your inspectors tin spell successful and stitchery that worldly and instrumentality it out?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: We are considering these options, of course. Our narration with Iran is simply a treaty-based obligation, due to the fact that adjacent successful the discourse of this warfare and the concern that we are in, Iran is simply a signatory to the Treaty connected the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, truthful they person a contractual work to let our inspectors in. Of course, there's communal sense. Nothing tin hap portion bombs are falling. But yes, I've been having important conversations present astatine the White House, and besides with Iran. There are immoderate contacts, and we anticipation to beryllium capable to reestablish that line.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you deliberation you tin revive parts of that woody that were being enactment unneurotic earlier the bombing began, wherever Iran would downblend? I mean, Oman's Foreign Minister connected this programme said that Iran had agreed to zero stockpiling, that they had agreed to nonstop that worldly retired and to dilute it down, downblend it.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Was determination truly the anticipation of a deal? Because it was conscionable hours earlier the bombing began that helium told america bid was possible.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: While, portion there's a negotiation, there's ever a anticipation of an agreement. We cannot contradict that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But you believed Iran genuinely was offering an option?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: There was a discussion, but determination was nary agreement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There was nary statement that Friday that the bombing began. The Omani overseas curate said helium needed different 90 days. Would a existent woody person been possible?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well- maybe, I think- I praise his efforts. I respect him enormously. I deliberation helium was truly trying very, precise hard, and we had agelong discussions. He invited maine in, of course, unneurotic with the 2 belligerents today. So we were having precise frank and precise heavy discussions. So 1 cannot contradict the nobility of the effort of idiosyncratic who's trying to forestall a war, and I applaud that arsenic a diplomat and arsenic a citizen. But determination was nary statement astatine that point. So overmuch so- retrieve this, you retrieve that we had agreed to person a method gathering connected the Monday aft the play wherever the cognition started. That should archer you that determination were precise significant, if not disagreements, determination was nary alignment connected what we- what galore of the things that were discussed that truly meant. And this is wherefore I offered and I said, well, let's- the method level piece, nonstop maine your radical to Vienna. We volition spell done this and spot what this oregon that may- whitethorn mean.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You wanted to support talking to debar subject action?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I felt that that was my obligation. I was invited to supply my method support.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, let's speech astir that. Because, you know, Iran disputes that they person a weapons programme now, but they bash person a atomic program, including a probe reactor successful Tehran for aesculapian isotopes. President Trump told reporters that this was "a implicit and mendacious pretense to fell the information that they were stockpiling there." He meant atomic fuel. The IAEA monitors that location. Is that what Iran was doing, secretly stockpiling material?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Let's effort to clarify, unpack that a small bit, due to the fact that there's besides a batch of disorder that I spot successful characterizing, what the- what the Tehran Research Reactor is, what is happening there. The applicable constituent for and successful presumption of this dialog and what could person happened is that this probe reactor, and successful wide probe reactors, necessitate for their substance a level of enrichment which is 20%.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Which was permitted nether existing agreements.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yes, but- yeah, it's permitted successful general. But the happening is that we were successful the mediate of a dialog which was proceeding from the presumption that determination wouldn't beryllium immoderate enrichment.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Zero enrichment?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Zero oregon thing very, precise limited. So erstwhile you, erstwhile you speech astir 20%, you are exceeding that amount. Forget astir if determination was stockpile oregon not. The concept, and this is what I would similar your assemblage to grasp, that the thought that if you spell for an statement that presupposes that you tin person 20%, this is 3 oregon 4 times much what the JCPOA was permitting. You remember, the level of enrichment agreed successful the JCPOA was 3.6. In general, enrichment--
MARGARET BRENNAN: But determination were allowments for these medical- I should conscionable clarify. I said President Trump. I meant President Trump's officials, his representatives said that. But for you, you- you did person questions astir this Tehran Research Reactor. I'm bringing it up due to the fact that these Trump officials support pointing to the IAEA arsenic providing accusation that made them say, hold a second, Iran's not being honest. Is that what you were telling the U.S.?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Not about- we don't sermon honesty oregon dishonesty. What we sermon is method capabilities, and what method capabilities whitethorn let you to bash oregon not. Intentions are legitimately discussed astatine the nationalist level, and I won't get into that treatment due to the fact that each state and the United States and the President of the United States has each close to judge that they were going to bash thing oregon that they person an intention. My occupation is simply a antithetic job, it is to explain, connected the ground of the technologies that are there, what tin hap and what is the interaction vis a vis the dialog you're trying to get. And 20% is simply a batch of enrichment.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So then, was it close for those Trump officials to accidental that the agency, your agency, provided the U.S. accusation that Iran ne'er erstwhile utilized that worldly to marque adjacent a azygous medicine, that everything that was being done determination was a screen for what could beryllium a atomic program?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, determination you're putting words that subordinate to intentions. And I don't get into the screen oregon thing similar this. What I tin accidental is that this is simply a reactor that perchance could beryllium utilized for vigor isotope production. There was very, precise limited. We were inspecting this facility. We are inspecting it, actually. So determination was constricted use. Of course, Iran has each close to say, no, we are going to person a large programme for vigor isotope you know, this is what is utilized to observe and sometimes cure cancer. So it's a [unintelligible].
MARGARET BRENNAN: But the IAEA is the UN, is this expected to beryllium conscionable calling balls and strikes, arsenic we accidental here, conscionable calling it arsenic they spot it?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yeah.
MARGARET BRENNAN: As you saw it, Iran mightiness person been cheating?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I think, again, to travel to the judgment, we person to person certainties. What we- and I spell backmost to what we were discussing astatine the opening of the conversation, Margaret. There were galore unanswered questions, galore unanswered questions, galore concerning facts. And what we were asking Iran is, springiness america the clarity that we need. If you accidental that you person a fatwa that prohibits the state to make atomic weapons, well, fto america check. If you don't person thing to hide, and this is, by the way, what we archer everybody successful the IAEA, let's say, operation, you don't person thing to hide? Show us.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right, and you want, you privation that entree now. U.S.- the U.S. Director of National Intelligence told Congress yesterday that Iran's enrichment programme was obliterated, that the U.S. has seen nary efforts to effort to rebuild their enrichment capability. Do you hold with that assessment? Do you person immoderate denotation that the caller Supreme Leader would privation a weapons program?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I don't disagree with that. We don't spot large activity, which is logical, due to the fact that determination is a- determination is simply a subject run ongoing, whatever- you're not going to start, you know, bringing cranes and workers--
MARGARET BRENNAN: --but they weren't doing it successful the pb up to the war, either, according to the Secretary of State.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Maybe. By the way, what we person is outer imagery, each right? So astatine slightest the IAEA, possibly others person different method means oregon idiosyncratic means to cheque what is happening. As acold arsenic we are concerned, we haven't seen activity. But arsenic I was saying, a batch inactive has survived. They person the capabilities, they person the knowledge, they person the concern quality to bash that. This is wherefore we request to spell backmost to a negotiating table. It's going to beryllium needed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And the U.S. has bombed doubly successful 9 months during the people of diplomacy. Who has the credibility to pb negotiations now? Do you deliberation it needs to beryllium a determination conversation?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I don't deliberation a determination speech would be- thing tin happen, and the IAEA volition help. But this is astir a nationalist programme connected a highly delicate nationalist information issue, similar a atomic program. So, I don't spot however a determination league oregon speech could beryllium much effectual than what is needed. We request the United States, of course, and Iran astatine the table. The IEA tin help, maybe, I don't know. The Omani effort could beryllium revived, I don't know, that is not my discussion, which is simply a governmental discussion. But I don't deliberation anybody would disagree, adjacent present successful Washington, that- that for a durable, long-standing solution, we volition person to spot each different again astir the table.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And Iran has reached retired to you? Their overseas curate has said he's funny successful a negotiation?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: It's- I wouldn't accidental that, it would beryllium unfair to him. But determination are contacts.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let maine conscionable inquire you astir 1 different thing. You said astir fractional the atomic worldly was astir Isfahan.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, it's a small spot more. There is- but the bulk of the worldly is there. And this is nary secret, due to the fact that I've seen a batch of hype astir it. This has been successful our reports. The immense bulk is there. There is immoderate successful Natanz arsenic well, and immoderate different parts.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There is absorption connected these different undeclared facilities President Trump has brought up. There's a installation called Pickaxe Mountain, for example, that comes up. Are you acrophobic astir those others?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well we should have- we should sojourn those. They were not operational. So this is wherefore we hadn't. You whitethorn retrieve that connected the- connected the eve of the June 2025 campaign, Iran announced that they had a caller enrichment installation successful Isfahan.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yes.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: On the aforesaid day, I issued a petition for an urgent inspection, which was granted, and the inspectors were there, and the greeting wherever the- oregon the, you know, precocious nighttime erstwhile the attacks happened. So we ne'er got to spot the place. We volition person to spell determination eventually.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But just- last thought here. Do you deliberation President Trump supports what I heard you say, which is that a subject run cannot destruct Iran's atomic program, and that the lone mode to recognize what they're truly doing is to beryllium connected the crushed inspecting it, and that can't beryllium done by the United States subject afloat either?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I think- I don't cognize what he- whether helium would endorse this oregon not, but helium has said besides that, of course, diplomacy is the preferred option. I deliberation that is encouraging, and we person had a precise constructive speech successful the past, and now. So--
MARGARET BRENNAN: Have you spoken to him?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Not to the president, no. I hadn't had the honor. But I was talking to radical that I person been talking successful the past. And we continue- we proceed this- this effort. I deliberation the essence of this is that successful the bleakest hour, we should ne'er suffer hope.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Director Grossi, convey you for your time.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Thank you precise much.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And we'll beryllium close back.
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